标题: 2022.02.24克里姆林宫为什么要在乌克兰寻求政权更迭。 [打印本页] 作者: shiyi18 时间: 2022-3-1 08:37 标题: 2022.02.24克里姆林宫为什么要在乌克兰寻求政权更迭。 By Invitation | Russia and Ukraine
Michael Kofman, an expert on Russia’s armed forces, explains why the Kremlin will seek regime change in Ukraine
Scenarios involving only limited fighting make little sense militarily
Feb 23rd 2022 (Updated Feb 24th 2022)
AFTER A LENGTHY and ominous speech, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin chose to recognise the breakaway Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics, in eastern Ukraine, on February 21st. Shortly afterwards, Russian troops marched in openly. Yet this decision marks the start of a new phase, rather than the end of the current standoff.
Mr Putin’s decision does nothing to satisfy the numerous grievances Russia’s leader has levied against Kyiv or his demands for security guarantees from NATO in recent months. Russian troops have already been in Ukraine’s Donbas region for eight years. In fact, by formally recognising the two republics he has given up his main leverage in Ukraine: the prospect of using the separatists to entrench Russian influence over its politics. Russian recognition is therefore part of a larger ploy to retain a say over Ukraine’s strategic orientation and domestic policies.
The evolution of this crisis, Mr Putin’s grievances and the current disposition of Russian forces suggest the start of a more significant play for Ukraine, with grand aims. The Kremlin’s recent claims of continuing escalation, and that Ukrainian soldiers crossed into Russian territory, appear to be part of a false-flag operation, building the case for a larger war. The recognition of Luhansk and Donetsk, and the subsequent approval of the Federation Council, the upper house of Russia’s legislature, authorises Moscow to use force abroad. This formally establishes the legal and political basis for military action in Ukraine, and Moscow can use force more broadly now if it accuses Ukraine of aggression against the newly independent statelets.
A new war would prove quite different from past Russian offensives during the summer of 2014 and winter 2015. Those battles resulted in the Minsk I and II ceasefires, imposed on Ukraine at gunpoint, but the deals are widely acknowledged in Moscow to have been failures that did not achieve Russia’s political aims. Repeating such operations—limited wars to coerce Ukraine into a deal—would come at great economic cost in exchange for no tangible benefit. Ukraine’s armed forces have improved and expanded considerably since 2014. A smaller war confined to the Donbas would incur higher casualties today, without good prospects for achieving any political objectives. If Russia seeks a quick and decisive victory, it will therefore have to dramatically expand the scope of the conflict—and the types of forces employed.
Russia has positioned more than 150,000 troops to surround Ukraine from Belarus in the north to Crimea in the south. Together with Russian-led forces in the Donbas, and auxiliaries including Rosgvardia, Russia’s national guard, this figure may exceed 190,000. These ground forces are supported by hundreds of tactical aircraft, forward-deployed attack helicopters and the Russian navy. This is not a force for a limited campaign, but one designed to pursue maximalist political aims. Russia will seek to surround and isolate Ukrainian forces in pockets of territory, forcing them to surrender, and attempt to impose regime change in Kyiv.
The Russian disposition of forces suggests that its general staff intends to conduct two major pincer movements into Ukraine. The lesser of the two will advance from the north on the capital, Kyiv. The larger attack will seek to encircle Ukrainian forces near Donbas. Russian-led units there may serve as a pinning force, while the main Russian grouping would advance from the north-east by Kharkiv and from Crimea in the south. In this scenario, Moscow would try to prevent Ukrainian forces from being able to conduct an organised retreat to more defensible terrain west of the Dnieper river.
This war would begin with air strikes, missile strikes and use of electronic warfare and cyber-attacks. Their goal would be to degrade, fragment and paralyse the Ukrainian armed forces along with its political leadership. This air campaign would be brief, followed by a combined arms ground offensive. Russia’s ground force is an artillery army with tanks and mechanised infantry. It emphasises decisive use of firepower. These formations would be backed by attack helicopters, tactical bombers and missile brigades. Those supporting elements would dramatically increase the effectiveness of Russian ground formations in combat.
Although Ukraine’s armed forces have improved since the fighting of 2014-2015, so have Russia’s. The units surrounding Ukraine are largely staffed by contract soldiers—professional servicemen, rather than conscripts—with high levels of readiness, modernised equipment and officers bloodied in several conflicts, such as the war in Syria. Ukraine’s military is understaffed, poorly supplied, and inexperienced in manoeuvre warfare. Russian forces therefore have considerable quantitative and qualitative superiority.
Much is contingent in war, but Ukraine’s odds are grim in a conventional fight, even with Western-supplied weapons. Its forces might convert into partisan warfare, or take to the cities. The latter would prove a difficult decision as urban warfare is immensely destructive. Moscow probably hopes to organise local security forces, or to co-opt political elites, to avoid being dragged into urban combat. The current Russian force may be enough to occupy Ukraine’s eastern regions and the capital, but if Russian leaders believe they can control large parts of the country, they are likely to be walking into a sustained insurgency.
Although Moscow has the military advantage, Russian pronouncements on Ukraine suggest that the Kremlin suffers from a high degree of war optimism—a common mistake made by aggressors throughout history. These conflicts tend to drag on well beyond the initial campaign, or escalate into regional wars. America’s experience in Iraq was hardly an aberration. Using force is always a gamble. If Mr Putin goes through with it, it will be the biggest he has made thus far. ■
Michael Kofman is the Director of the Russia Studies Program at CNA, an American defence research organisation. The views expressed here are his own.
