2022.08.03习近平可能会攻击台湾

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By Invitation | Taiwan
Xi Jinping may attack Taiwan to secure his legacy, warn Admiral Lee Hsi-min and Eric Lee
The pair believe a paradigm shift in Taiwan’s military strategy is now critical

Aug 3rd 2022

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THE RUSSIAN invasion of Ukraine has been a wake-up call for Taiwan. Every day images of destruction flash across Taiwanese television screens. They bring to mind Taiwan’s own potential future. Late-night talk-show hosts in Taipei, the capital, have shifted from discussing political gossip to analysing military tactics and ruminating on how the war in Ukraine will unfold, and what it all means. That faraway conflict has drawn attention to the existential threat facing Taiwan.

Under General Secretary Xi Jinping’s command, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has systematically strengthened its armed forces and prepared for an attack on Taiwan. The island’s government, its armed forces and its citizens must also prepare. After this year’s 20th CCP Congress in Beijing, expected to be held in November, there is a very real possibility of a sharp uptick in aggression towards Taiwan.


Mr Xi’s legacy is one reason why. He has promulgated grandiose goals for the CCP and has fundamentally altered the way in which China engages with the world. But he has yet to secure an achievement on a scale that would fix his legacy alongside those of supreme leaders such as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Mr Xi could attempt a feat that no other party leader has ever managed: conquering Taiwan.

Beijing is increasingly powerful, aggressive and ideologically hostile, and it is no secret that Mr Xi and the CCP elite seek to annex Taiwan. The questions are when and how. Military force remains an option. Mr Xi initiated massive reforms of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) which will enable China’s soldiers to better execute joint operations—those involving the army, air force and navy acting together—against Taiwan.

Mr Xi has directed China’s defence industry to churn out weapons specifically designed to prevent American forces from intervening to help Taiwan or other allies in the region. Such weapons include increasingly accurate and lethal ballistic and cruise missiles, integrated air-defence systems and anti-satellite weapons—all backed by a rapidly growing stockpile of nuclear weapons. As the PLA evolves, the CCP’s intentions seem increasingly clear. Even if Mr Xi is prioritising other options today, such as intimidating and isolating Taiwan, once the PLA is ready for an invasion Mr Xi’s decision to launch one could come with little warning.

The build-up of China’s armed forces is not the only problem that Taiwan faces. Taiwan has struggled to advance national-security objectives for a range of domestic reasons. These have included issues with military strategy and defence guidance, threat perception, military training and recruitment, and civilian-military relations—to name but a few.


Now is the time to rethink Taiwan’s national defence in its totality. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has altered traditional thinking about the effectiveness of conventional military strategies. It has made plain the shortcomings and vulnerabilities of large weapons platforms. It has also revealed the advantages of mobile, precise weapons on the battlefield. Events have proven that asymmetric warfare, in which a combatant attempts to thwart the strengths of a more powerful opponent, can defend against invasion. Taiwan should fully implement a truly asymmetric defence strategy.

There are those who say instead that Taiwan should have more conventional weapons, such as fighter jets, to stop China gaining control of the airspace. But given the enormous qualitative and quantitative disparity in combat power across the Strait, Taiwan will fail if it continues to focus solely on acquiring weapons that are not well suited to countering an invasion. Minor adjustments to weapons procurement will make no difference unless accompanied by fundamental changes in strategy, however. That is because an asymmetric strategy will dictate how weapons are actually used. Taiwan must innovate with its relatively limited resources. The country should prioritise deterring and, if necessary, defeating an invasion as its ultimate objective.

Taiwan plans on the assumption that China’s threat will probably manifest in two ways: through coercion and/or invasion. Coercion includes conventional and unconventional state-sponsored aggression below the threshold of all-out war. It includes escalating military intimidation in Taiwan’s skies and seas, through incursions and live-fire exercises around its territorial waters and airspace, for example. Such intimidation is happening already on a daily basis. In an invasion, the PLA would seek to destroy the government and occupy Taiwan’s territory in its totality. It is critical that Taiwan acknowledges the existence of both threats and develops commensurate countermeasures. But arguably the country is less prepared for invasion than it is coercion.

At the start of an all-out war across the Taiwan Strait, the PLA would launch waves of devastating missile strikes. The aim would be to destroy important political and military targets so as to weaken the public’s will and the armed forces’ ability to fight. An amphibious invasion would follow. Taiwan should narrowly aim to prevent such a landing, rather than seeking the more ambitious goals of sea control and air superiority. The military imbalance between the two sides means that China’s forces would overwhelm Taiwan’s with sheer numbers anyway, and also devastate ports and air bases, paralysing Taiwan’s navy and airforce.

Above all, Taiwan’s troops and weapons need to survive to counter an invasion. That means the armed forces must be mobile, resilient, lethal and dispersed. They must focus on the PLA’s vulnerabilities. Primarily, this would entail striking critical military nodes as well as exposed units crossing the Strait. Taiwan’s defensive advantage would be greatest when enemy forces are in the waters nearing Taiwan. When in transit, the PLA would be vulnerable and limited in its fighting capabilities. But Taiwan would be able to summon firepower from air, sea and ground assets while receiving cover from land-based air defences and protection from sea mines.


Military training should be overhauled and the armed forces organised to operate under decentralised command, as communications could fail. The government should train civilians and establish a voluntary territorial defence force (TDF) as any air blockade or quarantine would leave no opportunity for citizens to flee. A TDF would educate the public and strengthen its will to fight. The initiative would not be a death sentence for the Taiwanese people, sending all into war. Rather, by signalling that Taiwan would not raise the white flag even if enemy forces succeeded in landing on Taiwanese territory, the force would function as a deterrent. The PLA would know that it could complicate war plans.

Much attention has been focused on the specific weapons Taiwan needs to defend itself. But the country stands no chance without an effective strategy, tough training and the will to fight. In order to continue the freedom and prosperity it enjoys, Taiwan needs a paradigm shift to fundamentally change its approach to defence. ■

Admiral Lee Hsi-min served in Taiwan’s navy for over 40 years and was chief of the general staff of the country’s armed forces between 2017 and 2019. He is now a senior fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, a think-tank in Washington, DC, where he works with Eric Lee. Mr Lee is the institute’s associate director of programmes.



应邀参加 | 台湾
习近平可能会攻击台湾以确保他的遗产，李艾睿和李喜明上将警告说。
两人认为，台湾军事战略的范式转变现在至关重要。

2022年8月3日


俄罗斯对乌克兰的入侵已经给台湾敲响了警钟。每天，台湾的电视屏幕上都会出现破坏的画面。它们让人想到台湾自己潜在的未来。首都台北的深夜脱口秀主持人已经从讨论政治八卦转向分析军事战术，并思考乌克兰的战争将如何发展，以及这一切意味着什么。这一遥远的冲突使人们注意到台湾面临的生存威胁。

在习近平总书记的指挥下，中国共产党（CCP）已经系统地加强了其武装部队，并为攻击台湾做准备。岛上的政府、武装力量和公民也必须做好准备。预计今年11月在北京召开的中共第二十次代表大会后，对台湾的侵略很有可能急剧上升。


习近平先生的遗产是其中的一个原因。他为中共颁布了宏伟的目标，并从根本上改变了中国与世界交往的方式。但是，他还没有取得能够将他的遗产与毛泽东和邓小平等最高领导人的遗产并列的成就。习近平先生可以尝试其他政党领导人从未做过的壮举：征服台湾。

北京日益强大，咄咄逼人，在意识形态上充满敌意，习近平先生和中共精英们寻求吞并台湾，这已不是秘密。问题是何时和如何吞并。军事力量仍然是一种选择。习近平先生启动了对人民解放军的大规模改革，这将使中国的士兵能够更好地执行联合行动--那些涉及陆军、空军和海军共同行动的行动--来打击台湾。

习近平先生已指示中国的国防工业制造出专门用于防止美国军队干预以帮助台湾或该地区其他盟友的武器。这些武器包括越来越精确和致命的弹道导弹和巡航导弹、综合防空系统和反卫星武器--所有这些都得到了迅速增长的核武器储备的支持。随着解放军的发展，中国共产党的意图似乎越来越清晰。即使习近平先生今天优先考虑其他选择，如恐吓和孤立台湾，但一旦解放军做好了入侵的准备，习近平先生就会在没有任何警告的情况下决定发动一场入侵。

中国武装力量的集结并不是台湾面临的唯一问题。由于一系列的国内原因，台湾一直在努力推进国家安全的目标。这些原因包括军事战略和国防指导、威胁认知、军事训练和招募以及军民关系等问题，仅举几例。


现在是对台湾的国防进行全面反思的时候了。俄罗斯对乌克兰的入侵改变了对常规军事战略有效性的传统思维。它清楚地表明了大型武器平台的缺点和脆弱性。它还揭示了战场上机动、精确武器的优势。事件已经证明，非对称战争，即战斗人员试图挫败更强大的对手的实力，可以抵御入侵。台湾应该全面实施真正的不对称防御战略。

有些人反而说，台湾应该拥有更多的常规武器，比如战斗机，以阻止中国获得对领空的控制。但是，鉴于海峡两岸战斗力在质量和数量上的巨大差距，如果台湾继续只专注于采购那些不适合反击入侵的武器，它将会失败。然而，除非伴随着战略的根本改变，否则对武器采购的微小调整不会产生任何影响。这是因为不对称的战略将决定武器的实际使用方式。台湾必须利用其相对有限的资源进行创新。该国应优先考虑威慑，并在必要时击败入侵，作为其最终目标。

台湾的计划是假设中国的威胁可能会以两种方式表现出来：通过胁迫和/或入侵。胁迫包括低于全面战争门槛的常规和非常规的国家支持的侵略。它包括在台湾的天空和海洋中不断升级的军事恫吓，例如通过入侵和在其领海和领空周围进行实弹演习。这样的恫吓已经每天都在发生。在入侵中，解放军将寻求摧毁政府并全面占领台湾的领土。台湾必须承认这两种威胁的存在，并制定相应的反制措施。但可以说，台湾对入侵的准备比对胁迫的准备要少。

在台湾海峡两岸全面战争开始时，解放军将发动一波波毁灭性的导弹袭击。其目的是摧毁重要的政治和军事目标，以削弱公众的意愿和军队的战斗力。随后将是两栖入侵。台湾应该狭隘地以防止这种登陆为目标，而不是寻求更宏大的海洋控制和空中优势的目标。双方军事上的不平衡意味着中国军队无论如何都会在数量上压倒台湾军队，而且还会破坏港口和空军基地，使台湾的海军和空军瘫痪。

最重要的是，台湾的军队和武器需要生存下来，以对抗入侵。这意味着武装力量必须是机动的、有弹性的、致命的和分散的。他们必须专注于解放军的弱点。主要来说，这将需要打击关键的军事节点以及穿越海峡的暴露部队。当敌军在接近台湾的水域时，台湾的防卫优势将是最大的。在过境时，解放军会很脆弱，其战斗能力也很有限。但台湾将能够从空中、海上和地面资产中调集火力，同时得到陆基防空设施的掩护和海上水雷的保护。


军事训练应进行全面改革，并组织武装部队在分散的指挥下行动，因为通信可能失败。政府应该培训平民，建立一支自愿的领土防卫部队（TDF），因为任何空中封锁或隔离都不会给公民留下逃跑的机会。TDF将教育公众并加强其战斗意志。这一举措不会是对台湾人民的死刑判决，将所有人送入战争。相反，通过发出信号，即使敌军成功登陆台湾领土，台湾也不会举起白旗，这支部队将起到威慑的作用。解放军会知道，它可以使战争计划复杂化。

很多注意力都集中在台湾需要哪些具体的武器来保卫自己。但是，如果没有一个有效的战略、艰苦的训练和战斗的意志，这个国家就没有机会。为了继续它所享有的自由和繁荣，台湾需要一个范式的转变，从根本上改变它的防御方法。■

李喜明上将在台湾海军服役超过40年，并在2017年至2019年期间担任该国武装部队的总参谋长。他现在是华盛顿特区智囊团 "2049项目研究所 "的高级研究员，与李艾睿一起工作。李先生是该研究所的项目副主任。