2022.03.03 德国已经进入一个新时代

shiyi18

By Invitation | Russia and Ukraine
Wolfgang Ischinger argues that Germany has entered a new era
The country’s most experienced diplomat explains its astonishing foreign-policy U-turn

Mar 3rd 2022


SOMETHING DRAMATIC, even historic, happened in the Reichstag building in Berlin on February 27th. Olaf Scholz, Germany’s chancellor, announced a plan to spend an additional €100bn ($111bn) on defence; to support imposing sanctions on Russia (including ones related to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and SWIFT); to commit to two LNG terminals; to export weapons to Ukraine and to consider acquiring the American-made F-35 as the next generation of nuclear-capable German aircraft. This was a massive and almost complete policy turnaround, with a number of German foreign policy’s sacred cows slaughtered. Having prided themselves on continuity as a central element of German foreign policy for decades, German political elites were stunned. It became apparent that Mr Scholz was not only enjoying the support of his Ampelkoalition, traffic-light coalition, but also that of Germany’s new opposition leader, Friedrich Merz.

Throughout the past decade, maintaining the status quo was the bottom line of German foreign policy, often defined as Politik der Zurückhaltung, policy of restraint. To understand why, consider our recent history. After reunification in 1990, Germany developed a lasting love affair with stability. Germans endured huge changes after their catastrophic military and moral defeat in the second world war: the partition of Germany into East and West; membership of NATO and the European Union for West Germany; membership of the Warsaw Pact for East Germany. Then came the Berlin Wall in the 1960s, and later its fall and the reunification of Germany in 1989-90. For many Germans, this was more than enough change. They felt relief that four decades on the front line of the cold war were now ending, and they applauded when German leaders declared that “we are now only surrounded by friends”.


Angela Merkel understood all this extremely well. She managed to get herself re-elected three times by telling the Germans that she would not rock the boat. Partnership with Russia, as well as partnership with China, remained German aspirations even after the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, and in the face of China’s increasingly repressive domestic policies. Soberingly Mrs Merkel declared in 2017, having just met Donald Trump, that Europe could no longer rely on always being protected by America. But she did not follow up her remarks with action. Nuclear strategy and NATO’s goal of ensuring that its members spend 2% of GDP on defence were never among her priorities. Instead, she deserves praise for keeping the EU from falling apart during the Greek and euro crises, and Germany’s generous humanitarian position during the migration crisis. But Mrs Merkel failed to take advantage of the various crises and challenges confronting Europe to push Germany into a new role, and into a new era.

Enter Mr Scholz at the end of 2021. He did not really win the election last year; Mrs Merkel’s party lost it. Few expected him to lead his coalition effectively and he remained rather unimpressive in his first international appearances. Foreign-policy experts declared that the world around us was changing ever more quickly; we at the Munich Security Conference even published a report entitled “Zeitenwende”, or “Watershed,” at the end of 2020. But only after Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine last month did Mr Scholz explain that the German infatuation with the status quo was going up in flames. A new era—one far more dangerous than the three decades since reunification—had begun.

Mr Scholz is emerging as a “crisis chancellor”. If Angela Merkel had attempted to raise defence expenditure by €100bn, opposition parties would have organised street protests. But he has managed it. Has Mr Scholz risen to the challenge Mr Putin poses? The answers to these questions will depend on how well Mr Scholz is able to hold his traffic-light coalition together. Pacifist elements within it, including the Green party and the left wing of Mr Scholz’s own Social Democratic Party, may not stay quiet for long. The state of the war will determine their response.


The central task for Germany now is to strengthen the EU and to ensure that it is more respected as a strategic actor. Co-operation between France and Germany is critical, and Mr Scholz barely mentioned it in his speech on Sunday. If President Joe Biden, or another committed transatlanticist, were not in the White House at present, the EU would seriously struggle in the face of Mr Putin’s war. Mr Scholz’s coalition has promised to put German power at the service of the EU. That reminds me of words spoken by the author Thomas Mann some seven decades ago: “Our goal should not be a German Europe but a European Germany.” ■

Wolfgang Ischinger is the president of the Foundation Council of the Munich Security Conference (MSC) Foundation. He was chairman of the MSC, which organises an annual gathering of political and military leaders, from 2008 to 2022. Before that he was the German ambassador to America and to Britain.




应邀参加｜俄罗斯和乌克兰
沃尔夫冈-伊辛格认为，德国已经进入一个新时代
这个国家最有经验的外交官解释了其惊人的外交政策转折

2022年3月3日



2月27日，在柏林的国会大厦发生了一件戏剧性的、甚至是历史性的事情。德国总理奥拉夫-肖尔茨宣布了一项计划，即增加1000亿欧元（1110亿美元）的国防开支；支持对俄罗斯实施制裁（包括与北溪2号管道和SWIFT有关的制裁）；承诺建设两个液化天然气终端；向乌克兰出口武器，并考虑购买美国制造的F-35作为下一代具有核能力的德国飞机。这是一次大规模的、几乎完全的政策转变，德国外交政策中的一些神圣的牛被宰杀了。几十年来，德国的政治精英们一直以连续性作为德国外交政策的核心要素而自豪，他们被吓呆了。显然，肖尔茨先生不仅得到了他的Ampelkoalition（交通灯联盟）的支持，而且还得到了德国新的反对派领导人弗里德里希-默茨的支持。

在过去十年中，维持现状是德国外交政策的底线，通常被定义为Politik der Zurückhaltung，即克制政策。要了解原因，请考虑我们最近的历史。1990年统一后，德国对稳定产生了持久的爱慕之情。德国人在第二次世界大战中遭受灾难性的军事和道德失败后，经历了巨大的变化：德国被分割成东西两部分；西德加入了北约和欧盟；东德加入了华沙条约国。然后是20世纪60年代的柏林墙，以及后来的柏林墙倒塌和1989-90年的德国统一。对许多德国人来说，这已经是足够多的变化了。他们感到欣慰的是，在冷战前线的四十年现在已经结束了，当德国领导人宣布 "我们现在只被朋友包围 "时，他们鼓掌叫好。


安格拉-默克尔对这一切理解得非常透彻。她通过告诉德国人她不会摇摆不定，成功地使自己连任三次。即使在2014年俄罗斯吞并克里米亚之后，面对中国日益压抑的国内政策，与俄罗斯的伙伴关系以及与中国的伙伴关系仍然是德国的愿望。2017年，默克尔夫人在刚刚与唐纳德-特朗普会面时清醒地宣布，欧洲不能再依赖总是受到美国的保护。但她并没有用行动来跟进她的言论。核战略和北约确保其成员将国内生产总值的2%用于防务的目标，从来都不是她的优先事项之一。相反，她在希腊和欧元危机期间使欧盟不至于分崩离析，以及德国在移民危机期间采取慷慨的人道主义立场，都值得称赞。但默克尔夫人未能利用欧洲面临的各种危机和挑战，将德国推向一个新的角色，进入一个新时代。

2021年底，肖尔茨先生进入。他并没有真正赢得去年的选举；默克尔夫人的政党输掉了选举。很少有人指望他能有效地领导他的联盟，而且他在第一次国际亮相时仍然相当不引人注目。外交政策专家宣称，我们周围的世界正在发生越来越快的变化；我们在慕尼黑安全会议上甚至发表了一份题为 "Zeitenwende"，或 "Watershed "的报告，在2020年底。但是，只有在上个月普京入侵乌克兰之后，肖尔茨先生才解释说，德国对现状的迷恋正在火上浇油。一个新的时代--远比统一以来的三十年更危险--已经开始。

肖尔茨先生正在成为一个 "危机总理"。如果默克尔试图将国防开支提高1000亿欧元，反对党就会组织街头抗议。但他却做到了。朔尔茨先生是否能应对普京先生提出的挑战？这些问题的答案将取决于肖尔茨先生能在多大程度上维持他的交通灯联盟。联盟中的和平主义分子，包括绿党和肖尔茨先生自己的社会民主党的左翼，可能不会长期保持沉默。战争的状况将决定他们的反应。


德国现在的中心任务是加强欧盟，确保它作为一个战略行为体得到更多的尊重。法国和德国之间的合作至关重要，而肖尔茨先生在周日的演讲中几乎没有提到这一点。如果乔-拜登总统或另一位坚定的跨大西洋主义者目前不在白宫，欧盟将在普京先生的战争面前严重挣扎。肖尔茨先生的联盟已承诺将德国的力量用于为欧盟服务。这让我想起了作家托马斯-曼大约七十年前说过的话。"我们的目标不应该是一个德国的欧洲，而是一个欧洲的德国"。■

沃尔夫冈-伊辛格是慕尼黑安全会议（MSC）基金会理事会的主席。从2008年到2022年，他是慕尼黑安全会议的主席，该会议每年组织一次政治和军事领导人的聚会。在此之前，他是德国驻美国和驻英国大使。