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2022.05.24为什么拜登结束在台湾问题上的模棱两可是正确的?

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Why Biden Is Right to End Ambiguity on Taiwan
It was no gaffe when the president said the U.S. would defend the island against China, but good policy.

By David Frum
Graphic featuring Taiwanese and Chinese flags
The Atlantic; Getty
MAY 24, 2022
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About the author: David Frum is a staff writer at The Atlantic.

“White House Walks Back Biden Taiwan Defense Claim for Third Time in Nine Months” was the patronizing headline the New York Post applied to its report on President Joe Biden’s Taiwan comments at a regional summit in Tokyo. The story line was preset: semi-senile president blurts unscripted comment, is corrected by his staff minders.

But if you reread Biden’s repeated comments on Taiwan, you see a policy that is clear, considered, and consistent.

In August 2021, ABC’s George Stephanopoulos asked Biden whether withdrawal from Afghanistan might embolden China against Taiwan. Biden replied:

There’s a fundamental difference between—between Taiwan, South Korea, NATO. We are in a situation where they are in—entities we’ve made agreements with based on not a civil war they’re having on that island or in South Korea, but on an agreement where they have a unity government that, in fact, is trying to keep bad guys from doin’ bad things to them.

We have made—kept every commitment. We made a sacred commitment to Article Five that if in fact anyone were to invade or take action against our NATO allies, we would respond. Same with Japan, same with South Korea, same with—Taiwan. It’s not even comparable to talk about that.

In October, Biden restated his commitment even more forcefully and clearly, this time at a CNN town hall moderated by Anderson Cooper. An audience member asked, “China just tested a hypersonic missile. What will you do to keep up with them militarily? And can you vow to protect Taiwan?”

Biden answered:

Yes and yes. We are—militarily, China, Russia, and the rest of the world knows we have the most powerful military in the history of the world. Don’t worry about whether we’re going to—they’re going to be more powerful. What you do have to worry about is whether or not they’re going to engage in activities that will put them in a position where there—they may make a serious mistake.

And so, I have had—I have spoken and spent more time with Xi Jinping than any other world leader has. That’s why you have—you know, you hear people saying, “Biden wants to start a new Cold War with China.” I don’t want a Cold War with China. I just want to make China understand that we are not going to step back. We are not going to change any of our views.

Anderson Cooper then intervened to clarify: “So, are you saying that the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense if—”

Biden: Yes.
Cooper: China attacked?
Biden: Yes, we have a commitment to do that.

Now, in May 2022, Biden has repeated the pledge. At a news conference Monday in Tokyo, Nancy Cordes, of CBS News, asked, “You didn’t want to get involved in the Ukraine conflict militarily for obvious reasons. Are you willing to get involved militarily to defend Taiwan if it comes to that?” Biden answered, “Yes.”

Cordes followed up: “You are?” Biden answered: “That’s the commitment we made.”

Not only the Biden-skeptical New York Post but other media organizations, too, have treated these words as an unintended mess that he’d need to “untangle,” as the CBS anchor John Dickerson phrased it. But if there is a tangle, it’s not Biden’s fault.

U.S. policy toward Taiwan is often described as “strategic ambiguity,” usually understood as “The U.S. will defend Taiwan but won’t say so.” But behind this U.S. ambiguity has stood a prior Chinese ambiguity. China’s version of strategic ambiguity simultaneously:

proclaimed Beijing’s theoretical sovereignty over Taiwan, but
refrained from overt actions to assert that sovereignty.
In return for that ambiguous Chinese policy, Taiwan would refrain from challenging China’s sovereignty claims and the U.S. would refrain from any formal commitment to Taiwan’s security.

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David Frum: This is no time for protectionism

Under the rule of Xi Jinping, China has progressively reneged on the second half of its strategic ambiguity. China has ordered bigger and bigger incursions into Taiwan’s air-defense zone. China has the means to mount a naval blockade of the island. It has mounted sustained and aggressive cyberattacks. Throughout, Chinese leaders have growled explicit threats of armed force. Taiwanese officials describe the present situation as the most dangerous of the past 40 years.

So Biden is not leading this particular diplomatic two-step. Biden is not really initiating anything at all. As China jettisons its prior strategic ambiguity, so Biden has been pushed away from American strategic ambiguity. As Chinese threats of aggression have become more explicit, so, too, have U.S. promises of defense become more explicit.

Biden was also pushed and pulled by two other factors. Donald Trump, in his presidency, also walked away from “strategic ambiguity” over Taiwan—but, in his case, toward outright abandonment of Taiwan. “Taiwan is like two feet from China. We are eight thousand miles away. If they invade, there isn’t a fucking thing we can do about it.” Those words were uttered by Trump in private, according to a book by the Washington Post reporter Josh Rogin. But Biden had to worry that Trump communicated his feelings to Xi in their private conversations. If so, the credibility of the American commitment needed to be reaffirmed by Trump’s successor.

In another theater, the Russian invasion of Ukraine raised fresh questions about U.S. intentions. Ukraine was not a formal U.S. ally before the Russian invasion. The U.S. accordingly provided Ukraine with weapons and supplies to defend itself, but did not intervene directly. That careful delineation—no U.S. forces for non-ally Ukraine—had to raise questions within the Chinese leadership about whether the U.S. might follow a similar policy toward Taiwan, also not formally a U.S. ally. Biden may have felt it urgent to dispel any doubts on that score.

Read: The lessons Taiwan is learning from Ukraine

“Strategic ambiguity” was a policy initiated by President Jimmy Carter to assure China of respect while protecting Taiwan from invasion. It worked for a long time. But there was no guarantee that it would work forever. President Biden had good reason to worry that the four-decades-old policy was losing its effectiveness in the face of rising Chinese assertiveness. New times may call for new measures to keep the old peace.

For all portrayals of Biden as decrepit and doddering, it’s worth observing that he launched his new approach at an ingeniously propitious moment. For China, with its people restive under COVID lockdown, its economy slumping toward zero growth and possibly outright recession, its authoritarian partner in Moscow entrapped in a losing war, this is about as shaky a moment as any since Xi assumed power nearly a decade ago. Biden laid down his new rules at a moment of unusual vulnerability for China. By the time the Chinese have a better opportunity to act, the more explicit U.S. policy will have become a settled fact.

Biden’s aides are right, in a way, that he has not changed anything. As Biden said, the commitment was there before him. Now it’s just more visible than it used to be. His words in Tokyo were not a gaffe, not a blurt. They were a restatement of a message that needed to be heard, delivered at an opportune time.

David Frum is a staff writer at The Atlantic.



为什么拜登结束在台湾问题上的模棱两可是正确的?
当总统说美国将保卫台湾不受中国侵犯时,这并不是失误,而是好的政策。

作者:大卫-弗鲁姆
图为台湾和中国的旗帜
The Atlantic; Getty
2022年5月24日
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关于作者。大卫-弗鲁姆(David Frum)是《大西洋》杂志的一名工作人员。

"白宫9个月内第三次撤回拜登对台湾的辩护主张",这是《纽约邮报》在报道乔-拜登总统在东京举行的地区峰会上对台湾的评论时使用的一个傲慢的标题。故事的主线是预设的:半生不熟的总统发表了没有脚本的评论,被他的幕僚纠正了。

但是,如果你重读拜登对台湾问题的反复评论,你会看到一个清晰、深思熟虑和一致的政策。

2021年8月,美国广播公司的乔治-斯特凡诺普洛斯(George Stephanopoulos)问拜登,从阿富汗撤军是否会使中国对台湾胆怯。拜登回答说。

台湾、韩国、北约之间有一个根本的区别。我们所处的情况是,他们是我们与之达成协议的实体,其基础不是他们在该岛或南朝鲜的内战,而是他们有一个团结政府的协议,事实上,该政府正试图阻止坏人对他们做坏事。

我们已经做出了--遵守了每一个承诺。我们对第五条作出了神圣的承诺,如果事实上有人入侵或对我们的北约盟友采取行动,我们将作出回应。与日本一样,与韩国一样,与台湾一样。谈论这个问题根本没有可比性。

10月,拜登在安德森-库珀主持的美国有线电视新闻网(CNN)市民大会上更加有力和明确地重申了他的承诺。一位观众问道:"中国刚刚测试了一枚高超音速导弹。你将如何在军事上跟上他们的步伐?而且你能发誓保护台湾吗?"

拜登回答说。

是的,也是的。我们是--在军事上,中国、俄罗斯和世界其他国家都知道我们拥有世界历史上最强大的军队。不要担心我们是否会--他们会变得更强大。你必须担心的是,他们是否会从事一些活动,使他们处于一个他们可能犯严重错误的位置。

因此,我与习近平的交谈和相处时间比任何其他世界领导人都要多。这就是为什么你有-你知道,你听到人们说,"拜登想与中国开始一场新的冷战"。我不希望与中国发生冷战。我只是想让中国明白,我们不会后退。我们不会改变我们的任何观点。

安德森-库珀随后插话澄清:"那么,你是说美国会来保卫台湾,如果--"

拜登:是的。
库珀。中国进攻了?
拜登:是的,我们有承诺要这样做。

现在,在2022年5月,拜登又重复了这个承诺。周一在东京举行的新闻发布会上,CBS新闻的南希-科德斯问道:"出于明显的原因,你不想在军事上卷入乌克兰冲突。如果事情发展到这一步,你是否愿意军事介入以保卫台湾?" 拜登回答说:"是的。"

科德斯追问道。"你是吗?" 拜登回答说。"这就是我们做出的承诺。"

不仅是对拜登持怀疑态度的《纽约邮报》,其他媒体机构也把这些话当作他需要 "解开纠结 "的无心之过,正如哥伦比亚广播公司主播约翰-迪克森的措辞。但是,如果有什么纠结,那也不是拜登的错。

美国的对台政策经常被描述为 "战略模糊",通常被理解为 "美国将保卫台湾,但不会说出来"。但在美国这种模糊性的背后,却站着一个事先的中国模糊性。中国的战略模糊性版本同时也是。

宣称北京对台湾拥有理论上的主权,但是
但又不采取公开的行动来维护这一主权。
作为对中国这种模糊政策的回报,台湾将避免挑战中国的主权要求,而美国将避免对台湾的安全作出任何正式承诺。

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David Frum: 现在不是搞保护主义的时候

在习近平的统治下,中国逐渐背弃了其战略模糊性的后半部分。中国已下令对台湾的防空区进行越来越大的入侵。中国有办法对该岛进行海上封锁。它已经发动了持续和积极的网络攻击。自始至终,中国领导人都在咆哮,明确威胁要使用武力。台湾官员将目前的局势描述为过去40年中最危险的一次。

所以拜登并没有领导这个特殊的外交两步走。拜登根本就没有真正发起任何行动。随着中国抛弃其先前的战略模糊性,拜登也被推离了美国的战略模糊性。随着中国的侵略威胁变得更加明确,美国的防御承诺也变得更加明确。

拜登还受到另外两个因素的推拉。唐纳德-特朗普在担任总统期间,也摆脱了在台湾问题上的 "战略模糊性"--但在他看来,是朝着彻底放弃台湾的方向走。"台湾离中国就像两只脚。我们在八千英里之外。如果他们入侵,我们他妈的一点办法都没有。" 根据《华盛顿邮报》记者乔什-罗金的书,这些话是特朗普私下说的。但拜登不得不担心,特朗普在他们的私人谈话中向习近平传达了他的感受。如果是这样,美国承诺的可信度需要由特朗普的继任者来重申。

在另一个战场上,俄罗斯对乌克兰的入侵引发了对美国意图的新质疑。在俄罗斯入侵之前,乌克兰并不是美国的正式盟友。因此,美国向乌克兰提供了武器和物资以保护自己,但没有直接干预。这种谨慎的划分--美国不为非乌克兰提供军队--不得不引起中国领导人的质疑,即美国是否会对同样不是美国正式盟友的台湾采取类似政策。拜登可能觉得迫切需要消除这方面的任何疑虑。

阅读。台湾正在从乌克兰学到的教训

"战略模糊 "是由吉米-卡特总统发起的一项政策,目的是向中国保证尊重,同时保护台湾不受入侵。它在很长一段时间内起了作用。但不能保证它将永远有效。拜登总统有充分的理由担心,面对中国日益强硬的态度,这项有四十年历史的政策正在失去其效力。新的时代可能需要新的措施来维持旧的和平。

尽管有人把拜登描绘成老朽,但值得注意的是,他是在一个巧妙的有利时机推出他的新方法。对中国来说,在COVID的封锁下,中国的人民很不稳定,其经济正朝着零增长甚至可能直接衰退的方向下滑,其在莫斯科的专制伙伴陷入了一场失败的战争,这是自习近平近十年前上台以来最不稳定的时刻。拜登在中国异常脆弱的时刻制定了他的新规则。当中国有更好的机会采取行动时,更明确的美国政策将成为一个既定事实。

拜登的助手们在某种程度上是对的,他没有改变任何东西。正如拜登所说,承诺在他之前就已经存在。现在它只是比以前更明显了。他在东京说的话不是口误,也不是口误。他们是在一个合适的时间重申了一个需要被听到的信息。

大卫-弗鲁姆(David Frum)是《大西洋》杂志的一名工作人员。
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