1999.09,16主权的两个概念

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International | BY INVITATION
Two concepts of sovereignty
As heads of state and government gather in New York for the annual session of the UN General Assembly Kofi Annan, the UN secretary-general, gives us his thoughts on international intervention in humanitarian crises, and the changes needed for the next century
Sep 16th 1999 | NEW YORK

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THE tragedy of East Timor, coming so soon after that of Kosovo, has focused attention once again on the need for timely intervention by the international community when death and suffering are being inflicted on large numbers of people, and when the state nominally in charge is unable or unwilling to stop it.

In Kosovo a group of states intervened without seeking authority from the United Nations Security Council. In Timor the council has now authorised intervention, but only after obtaining an invitation from Indonesia. We all hope that this will rapidly stabilise the situation, but many hundreds—probably thousands—of innocent people have already perished. As in Rwanda five years ago, the international community stands accused of doing too little, too late.


Neither of these precedents is satisfactory as a model for the new millennium. Just as we have learnt that the world cannot stand aside when gross and systematic violations of human rights are taking place, we have also learnt that, if it is to enjoy the sustained support of the world's peoples, intervention must be based on legitimate and universal principles. We need to adapt our international system better to a world with new actors, new responsibilities, and new possibilities for peace and progress.

State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined—not least by the forces of globalisation and international co-operation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty—by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties—has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. When we read the charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them.

These changes in the world do not make hard political choices any easier. But they do oblige us to think anew about such questions as how the UN responds to humanitarian crises; and why states are willing to act in some areas of conflict, but not in others where the daily toll of death and suffering is as bad or worse. From Sierra Leone to Sudan, from Angola to Afghanistan, there are people who need more than words of sympathy. They need a real and sustained commitment to help end their cycles of violence, and give them a new chance to achieve peace and prosperity.


The genocide in Rwanda showed us how terrible the consequences of inaction can be in the face of mass murder. But this year's conflict in Kosovo raised equally important questions about the consequences of action without international consensus and clear legal authority.

It has cast in stark relief the dilemma of so-called “humanitarian intervention”. On the one hand, is it legitimate for a regional organisation to use force without a UN mandate? On the other, is it permissible to let gross and systematic violations of human rights, with grave humanitarian consequences, continue unchecked? The inability of the international community to reconcile these two compelling interests in the case of Kosovo can be viewed only as a tragedy.

To avoid repeating such tragedies in the next century, I believe it is essential that the international community reach consensus—not only on the principle that massive and systematic violations of human rights must be checked, wherever they take place, but also on ways of deciding what action is necessary, and when, and by whom. The Kosovo conflict and its outcome have prompted a debate of worldwide importance. And to each side in this debate difficult questions can be posed.

To those for whom the greatest threat to the future of international order is the use of force in the absence of a Security Council mandate, one might say: leave Kosovo aside for a moment, and think about Rwanda. Imagine for one moment that, in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, there had been a coalition of states ready and willing to act in defence of the Tutsi population, but the council had refused or delayed giving the green light. Should such a coalition then have stood idly by while the horror unfolded?

To those for whom the Kosovo action heralded a new era when states and groups of states can take military action outside the established mechanisms for enforcing international law, one might equally ask: Is there not a danger of such interventions undermining the imperfect, yet resilient, security system created after the second world war, and of setting dangerous precedents for future interventions without a clear criterion to decide who might invoke these precedents and in what circumstances? Nothing in the UN charter precludes a recognition that there are rights beyond borders. What the charter does say is that “armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest.” But what is that common interest? Who shall define it? Who shall defend it? Under whose authority? And with what means of intervention? In seeking answers to these monumental questions, I see four aspects of intervention which need to be considered with special care.

First, “intervention” should not be understood as referring only to the use of force. A tragic irony of many of the crises that go unnoticed or unchallenged in the world today is that they could be dealt with by far less perilous acts of intervention than the one we saw this year in Yugoslavia. And yet the commitment of the world to peacekeeping, to humanitarian assistance, to rehabilitation and reconstruction varies greatly from region to region, and crisis to crisis. If the new commitment to humanitarian action is to retain the support of the world's peoples, it must be—and must be seen to be—universal, irrespective of region or nation. Humanity, after all, is indivisible.


Second, it is clear that traditional notions of sovereignty alone are not the only obstacle to effective action in humanitarian crises. No less significant are the ways in which states define their national interests. The world has changed in profound ways since the end of the cold war, but I fear our conceptions of national interest have failed to follow suit. A new, broader definition of national interest is needed in the new century, which would induce states to find greater unity in the pursuit of common goals and values. In the context of many of the challenges facing humanity today, the collective interest is the national interest.

Third, in cases where forceful intervention does become necessary, the Security Council—the body charged with authorising the use of force under international law—must be able to rise to the challenge. The choice must not be between council unity and inaction in the face of genocide—as in the case of Rwanda—and council division, but regional action, as in the case of Kosovo. In both cases, the UN should have been able to find common ground in upholding the principles of the charter, and acting in defence of our common humanity.

As important as the council's enforcement power is its deterrent power, and unless it is able to assert itself collectively where the cause is just and the means available, its credibility in the eyes of the world may well suffer. If states bent on criminal behaviour know that frontiers are not an absolute defence—that the council will take action to halt the gravest crimes against humanity—then they will not embark on such a course assuming they can get away with it. The charter requires the council to be the defender of the “common interest”. Unless it is seen to be so—in an era of human rights, interdependence and globalisation—there is a danger that others will seek to take its place.

Fourth, when fighting stops, the international commitment to peace must be just as strong as was the commitment to war. In this situation, too, consistency is essential. Just as our commitment to humanitarian action must be universal if it is to be legitimate, so our commitment to peace cannot end as soon as there is a ceasefire. The aftermath of war requires no less skill, no less sacrifice, no fewer resources than the war itself, if lasting peace is to be secured.

This developing international norm in favour of intervention to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter will no doubt continue to pose profound challenges to the international community. In some quarters it will arouse distrust, scepticism, even hostility. But I believe on balance we should welcome it. Why? Because, despite all the difficulties of putting it into practice, it does show that humankind today is less willing than in the past to tolerate suffering in its midst, and more willing to do something about it.



国际--应邀参加
主权的两个概念
在各国元首和政府首脑齐聚纽约参加联合国大会年度会议之际，联合国秘书长科菲-安南就国际社会对人道主义危机的干预以及下个世纪需要的变革发表了自己的看法。
1999年9月16日｜纽约

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在科索沃悲剧发生后不久，东帝汶的悲剧再次使人们注意到，当大量人口遭受死亡和痛苦，而名义上的主管国不能或不愿意阻止时，国际社会需要及时干预。

在科索沃，一些国家没有寻求联合国安全理事会的授权就进行了干预。在东帝汶，安理会现在已经授权进行干预，但只是在获得印度尼西亚的邀请之后。我们都希望这将迅速稳定局势，但已经有数百人--可能是数千人的无辜者丧生。正如五年前在卢旺达一样，国际社会被指责做得太少、太晚。


作为新千年的模式，这两个先例都不能令人满意。正如我们已经了解到，在发生严重和系统的侵犯人权行为时，世界不能袖手旁观，我们还了解到，如果要得到世界各国人民的持续支持，干预必须建立在合法和普遍的原则之上。我们需要使我们的国际体系更好地适应一个拥有新的行为者、新的责任和新的和平与进步可能性的世界。

国家主权，在其最基本的意义上，正在被重新定义--特别是被全球化和国际合作的力量重新定义。国家现在被广泛理解为是为其人民服务的工具，而不是反过来。同时，个人主权--我指的是《联合国宪章》和随后的国际条约中规定的每个人的基本自由--由于个人权利意识的更新和传播而得到加强。当我们今天阅读宪章时，我们比以往任何时候都更清楚地意识到，它的目的是保护人类个体，而不是保护那些虐待人类的人。

世界上的这些变化并没有使艰难的政治选择变得容易。但它们确实迫使我们重新思考这样的问题：联合国如何应对人道主义危机；以及为什么各国愿意在某些冲突地区采取行动，而不愿意在其他地区采取行动，因为那里每天的死亡和痛苦人数同样严重，甚至更多。从塞拉利昂到苏丹，从安哥拉到阿富汗，有些人需要的不仅仅是同情的语言。他们需要一个真正的、持续的承诺，帮助他们结束暴力循环，给他们一个实现和平与繁荣的新机会。


卢旺达的种族灭绝事件向我们表明，面对大规模的谋杀，不采取行动的后果是多么可怕。但今年的科索沃冲突提出了同样重要的问题，即在没有国际共识和明确法律权威的情况下采取行动的后果。

它使所谓的 "人道主义干预 "的两难境地变得非常明显。一方面，一个区域组织在没有联合国授权的情况下使用武力是否合法？另一方面，让严重和系统地侵犯人权并造成严重人道主义后果的行为继续下去而不被制止，这是否是可以允许的？国际社会在科索沃问题上无法调和这两种迫切的利益，只能被视为一场悲剧。

为了避免在下个世纪重复这样的悲剧，我认为国际社会必须达成共识--不仅要在大规模和系统性侵犯人权的行为无论发生在何处都必须加以制止的原则上达成共识，而且要在决定什么行动是必要的、什么时候、由谁来采取的方法上达成共识。科索沃冲突及其结果引发了一场具有世界意义的辩论。对这场辩论中的每一方都可以提出困难的问题。

对于那些认为对国际秩序未来的最大威胁是在没有安全理事会授权的情况下使用武力的人来说，我们可以说：先把科索沃放在一边，想想卢旺达。想象一下，在导致种族灭绝的那些黑暗的日子和时间里，有一个国家联盟准备并愿意采取行动保护图西人，但安理会拒绝或推迟开绿灯。难道这样一个联盟就应该在恐怖事件发生时袖手旁观吗？

对于那些认为科索沃行动预示着一个新的时代，即国家和国家集团可以在执行国际法的既定机制之外采取军事行动的人来说，我们同样可以问：这种干预是否存在破坏第二次世界大战后建立的不完善但有弹性的安全体系的危险，以及在没有明确的标准来决定谁可以援引这些先例以及在什么情况下进行干预的情况下为未来的干预设定危险的先例？联合国宪章中并没有排除承认有超越国界的权利。宪章确实规定，"除非为了共同利益，否则不得使用武力"。但共同利益是什么？由谁来定义它？谁来保卫它？在谁的授权下？用什么手段进行干预？在寻求这些重大问题的答案时，我认为需要特别谨慎地考虑干预的四个方面。

首先，"干预 "不应理解为仅指使用武力。当今世界上许多危机没有被注意到或没有受到挑战，其中一个悲惨的讽刺是，这些危机可以通过比我们今年在南斯拉夫看到的危险性小得多的干预行为来处理。然而，世界对维持和平、对人道主义援助、对恢复和重建的承诺在不同地区、不同危机之间存在很大差异。如果对人道主义行动的新承诺要保持世界人民的支持，它就必须是--而且必须被视为是--普遍的，不分地区或国家。毕竟，人类是不可分割的。


第二，很明显，传统的主权概念本身并不是在人道主义危机中采取有效行动的唯一障碍。同样重要的是，国家界定其国家利益的方式。自冷战结束以来，世界已经发生了深刻的变化，但我担心我们对国家利益的概念却没有跟上。新世纪需要一个新的、更广泛的国家利益定义，这将促使各国在追求共同目标和价值观方面找到更大的团结。在人类今天面临的许多挑战中，集体利益就是国家利益。

第三，在确实需要武力干预的情况下，安全理事会--负责根据国际法授权使用武力的机构--必须能够迎接挑战。在面对种族灭绝的情况下，安理会的团结和不作为--如卢旺达的情况，以及安理会的分裂，但区域行动--如科索沃的情况，两者之间决不能选择。在这两种情况下，联合国本应能够在维护宪章原则方面找到共同点，并为捍卫我们共同的人性而采取行动。

与安理会的执行力同样重要的是它的威慑力，除非它能够在理由正当、手段可用的情况下集体坚持自己的立场，否则它在世界眼中的信誉很可能受到影响。如果有犯罪行为的国家知道边界不是绝对的防御--安理会将采取行动阻止最严重的反人类罪行--那么他们就不会走上这样的道路，以为自己可以逃脱。宪章要求安理会成为 "共同利益 "的捍卫者。除非在人权、相互依存和全球化的时代，它被认为是这样的，否则其他国家就有可能寻求取代它的位置。

第四，当战斗停止时，对和平的国际承诺必须与对战争的承诺一样强烈。在这种情况下，一致性也是至关重要的。正如我们对人道主义行动的承诺必须是普遍的，如果它是合法的，那么我们对和平的承诺也不能在停火后立即结束。如果要确保持久和平，战争的后果所需要的技能、牺牲和资源并不比战争本身少。

这种有利于干预以保护平民免遭大规模屠杀的国际准则的发展，无疑将继续对国际社会构成深刻的挑战。在某些方面，它将引起人们的不信任、怀疑甚至敌视。但我认为，总的来说，我们应该欢迎它。为什么呢？因为，尽管将其付诸实施有种种困难，但它确实表明，今天的人类比过去更不愿意容忍其间的苦难，而更愿意为之做点什么。