2022.04.13 为什么俄罗斯军队在乌克兰失败？

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By Invitation | Russia and Ukraine
Andriy Zagorodnyuk explains why Russia’s army is failing in Ukraine
Ukraine’s former defence minister says Russia badly underestimated both Ukraine and the West

Apr 13th 2022 (Updated Apr 13th 2022)


ONE OF THE main lessons of Russia’s war in Ukraine is already clear: a formidable advantage in capabilities is no guarantee of success. Comparing the size of the two countries’ forces, most Western experts did not hold much hope for Ukraine. The fighting so far, however, has played out contrary to expectations.

Is it possible that Russia’s leadership is unaware of its army’s shortcomings? Like other authoritarian states, Russia does not have independent government oversight over its armed forces. In Western countries this oversight comes through parliament and a civilian ministry of defence, in an effort to ensure both a high state of readiness and an efficient use of funds. In Russia, the armed forces report directly to the president. The dysfunctionality of such a system has clearly led to the deterioration of military capabilities, even though the country has one of the largest military budgets in the world. Russian forces have already seen as many as one-third of the mission’s 120,000 ground troops either killed or wounded, showing that motivation, planning and civilian support are more effective than numbers.


Russia’s strategic mistake has been an overestimation of its own capabilities and an underestimation of Ukrainian ones. Their whole plan was based on one main scenario which involved suppressing Ukrainian air defences, multiple advances on key Ukrainian cities and a successful lightning attack on Kyiv. They failed to anticipate just how much resistance they would meet from Ukraine’s armed forces and from its civilians. Similarly, the Russians underestimated the West’s response: sanctions, Russia’s economic isolation and weapons supplies have all helped Ukraine.

Ukraine’s armed forces have also been trained well. They have advantages on their side. They know the country’s territory well and they have true motivation to fight. Soldiers are defending their homes and families. By contrast Russian forces have changed their operational objectives several times.

Reforms in the Ukrainian army in recent years are now proving their worth, too. Many were inspired by the organisational structure of Western forces. One of the most important changes Ukraine made was to elevate the role of non-commissioned officers—senior enlisted men, like sergeants, who supervise troops—in the manner of NATO armies. This allows knowledge and skills to be passed on to soldiers. The Western principle of “mission command” has also been adopted by Ukraine’s forces. It allows the officers in charge of small units greater power over decisions, rendering those units more agile. The Russians have stuck with a top-heavy Soviet organisational structure instead.

Ukraine has also seen the potential of the civilian population. In recent years Ukraine reformed its territorial defence system, encouraging civilians to form local resistance units. They were set up in many cities. Knowledgeable of the terrain and driven by patriotism, the units have challenged Russian troops on every corner, attacking armoured vehicles, support and fuel convoys. Unable to cover long distances without proper fuel supply, Russian forces were often stopped in the middle of nowhere as a result.


Technology and tactics have also played an important role. During eight years of war in Donbas Ukraine has mastered the use of artillery and other arms. In addition, Ukrainian forces acquired modern weapons, including portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft systems, procured with the help of Western partners such as America and Britain. Operating in small groups that are difficult to target from the air, they attacked Russian troops from different sides. Armed drones, bought from Turkey, have also wreaked destruction on Russian formations. Despite a military budget one-eleventh the size of Russia’s, Ukraine could score significant victories through local knowledge, impassioned commitment and civilian support.

Substantial number of volunteers are fighting in cyber forces and cyber groups defending Ukraine’s critical infrastructure from attacks. Despite relentless attacks, our mobile and internet networks still function. Citizens can still access banks and utilities as needed.

The poor state of Russian land forces has been another big surprise. Everyone expected high-tech equipment, professional troops and efficient supply lines. But an examination of captured vehicles revealed outdated communication devices and expired food rations.

Russia has not yet lost the war, however. Fierce fights have been breaking out every day. After failing elsewhere, the Russians now focus on the east of Ukraine. The destruction of Mariupol and damage to Chernihiv and Kharkiv has shocked the world. Terrible atrocities tell us that Russian leadership has decided to terrorise civilians as a tactic. Unable to outmanoeuvre the Ukrainian forces, Russia compensates with brutality. The next battle looms in the Donbas region. If the goal has been to coerce Ukrainians through fear it has not worked. Russia’s hostility only makes Ukraine angrier—and stronger.

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Andriy Zagorodnyuk was defence minister of Ukraine from 2019-20. He is the co-founder and chairman of the Centre for Defence Strategies, a security think-tank based in Ukraine.



应邀参加｜俄罗斯和乌克兰
安德里-扎戈罗德纽克解释俄罗斯军队在乌克兰失败的原因
乌克兰前国防部长表示，俄罗斯严重低估了乌克兰和西方的实力

2022年4月13日（2022年4月13日更新）



俄罗斯在乌克兰战争中的一个主要教训已经很清楚：能力上的巨大优势并不能保证成功。对比两国军队的规模，大多数西方专家对乌克兰不抱太大希望。然而，到目前为止，战斗的结果与预期相反。

俄罗斯的领导层有没有可能没有意识到其军队的缺点？与其他专制国家一样，俄罗斯没有对其武装部队进行独立的政府监督。在西方国家，这种监督是通过议会和文职国防部进行的，目的是确保高度的战备状态和资金的有效使用。在俄罗斯，武装力量直接向总统报告。尽管俄罗斯是世界上军事预算最多的国家之一，但这样一个系统的功能失调显然导致了军事能力的恶化。俄罗斯部队已经有多达三分之一的特派团12万地面部队被杀或受伤，这表明动机、规划和文职支持比数字更有效。


俄罗斯的战略错误是高估了自己的能力，低估了乌克兰的能力。他们的整个计划是基于一个主要方案，其中包括压制乌克兰的防空系统，对乌克兰主要城市的多次推进以及对基辅的成功闪电攻击。他们没有预料到他们会从乌克兰的武装部队和平民那里遇到多少抵抗。同样，俄罗斯人也低估了西方的反应：制裁、俄罗斯的经济孤立和武器供应都帮助了乌克兰。

乌克兰的武装力量也得到了很好的训练。他们有自己的优势。他们对国家的领土非常了解，他们有真正的战斗动力。士兵们正在保卫自己的家园和家人。相比之下，俄罗斯军队已经数次改变了他们的作战目标。

乌克兰军队近年来的改革现在也证明了其价值。许多改革是受到西方部队组织结构的启发。乌克兰所做的最重要的改变之一是提升了军士的作用--像军士一样的高级士兵，他们负责监督部队，与北约军队一样。这使得知识和技能可以传授给士兵。西方的 "任务指挥 "原则也被乌克兰部队采用。它允许负责小部队的军官拥有更大的决策权，使这些部队更加灵活。俄罗斯人则坚持采用头重脚轻的苏联组织结构。

乌克兰也看到了平民的潜力。近年来，乌克兰改革了其领土防卫体系，鼓励平民组建地方抵抗部队。他们在许多城市成立了。这些部队熟悉地形，受爱国主义驱使，在每个角落向俄罗斯军队发起挑战，攻击装甲车、支援和燃料车队。由于没有适当的燃料供应，俄军无法长途跋涉，结果常常被拦在半路。


技术和战术也发挥了重要作用。在顿巴斯八年的战争中，乌克兰已经掌握了大炮和其他武器的使用。此外，乌克兰部队获得了现代武器，包括在美国和英国等西方伙伴的帮助下采购的便携式反坦克和防空系统。他们以难以从空中瞄准的小团体形式行动，从不同侧面攻击俄罗斯军队。从土耳其购买的武装无人机也对俄罗斯编队进行了破坏。尽管乌克兰的军事预算只有俄罗斯的十一分之一，但它可以通过当地知识、热情的承诺和平民的支持取得重大胜利。

大量的志愿者在网络部队和网络团体中作战，保卫乌克兰的关键基础设施不受攻击。尽管受到无情的攻击，我们的移动和互联网网络仍然运作。公民仍然可以根据需要访问银行和公用事业。

俄罗斯陆军的糟糕状况是另一个大惊喜。每个人都期望高科技设备、专业部队和高效的供应线。但对缴获的车辆进行检查后发现，通信设备已经过时，食物配给也已过期。

然而，俄罗斯还没有输掉这场战争。激烈的战斗每天都在爆发。在其他地方失败后，俄罗斯人现在把重点放在乌克兰东部。马里乌波尔被毁，切尔尼戈夫和哈尔科夫遭到破坏，令世界震惊。可怕的暴行告诉我们，俄罗斯领导人已经决定将恐吓平民作为一种战术。由于无法与乌克兰军队周旋，俄罗斯以残暴的方式进行补偿。下一场战斗在顿巴斯地区迫在眉睫。如果目标是通过恐惧来胁迫乌克兰人，那么它并没有成功。俄罗斯的敌意只会让乌克兰更加愤怒和强大。

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安德里-扎戈罗德纽克（Andriy Zagorodnyuk）在2019-20年期间担任乌克兰国防部长。他是设在乌克兰的安全智囊团 "国防战略中心 "的联合创始人和主席。