2022.09.04 什么是上海合作组织？

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What is the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation?
Conflicting visions among its growing membership mean it poses little threat to the West
FILE - Chinese President Xi Jinping, right, and Russian President Vladimir Putin pose for a photo at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Qingdao in eastern China's Shandong Province on June 10, 2018. President Xi Jinping is using his first trip abroad since the start of the pandemic to promote China's strategic ambitions at a summit with Putin and other leaders of a Central Asian security group. (AP Photo/Alexander Zemlianichenko, File)
Sep 14th 2022

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Western leaders may cast a nervous glance at Samarkand, a city in Uzbekistan, where the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (sco) gathers for a summit on September 15th and 16th. China’s president, Xi Jinping, on his first foreign trip since the outbreak of covid-19, is expected to meet his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin. Others attending include Iran’s president, Ebrahim Raisi; his country is set to become a full member. Western leaders are pointedly not invited to the meeting, the organisation’s first summit since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. What does the sco do, and should it worry the West?

The sco was founded in 2001, by China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, to discuss security and economic matters in Central Asia, with a focus on fighting terrorism and strengthening trade links. Although its members have conducted joint military exercises, the group is neither a formal defence alliance, like nato, nor an official economic union like the eu. It was envisaged as a forum through which China and Russia could manage neighbourly relations. But the sco’s recent expansion has complicated this mission. India and Pakistan were granted full membership in 2017, while the terms for Iran’s accession were established at a virtual summit in 2021. Afghanistan, Belarus and Mongolia have “observer” status. And the club has several “dialogue partners”, including Turkey.


The sco’s rapid growth reflects competing visions of what it might become. Russia’s isolation from the West makes it keen to trumpet its geopolitical importance elsewhere. It hopes a bigger sco might offer a way for non- or anti-Western powers to collaborate, and a platform to espouse the benefits of what Mr Putin calls a “multipolar” world. Iran might feel the same way. The possible accession of Belarus, a Russian vassal, which is on the docket for discussion at this year’s summit, would pull in the same direction.

But China, the member with the most clout, is more pragmatic. Although it shares Russia’s anti-American sentiment, it is less bothered by grand notions of ideological alignment, says Yu Jie of Chatham House, a think-tank in London. China views the sco as a means to ensure security in its neighbourhood and to protect its economic interests across Eurasia, where it has invested billions of dollars in infrastructure as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. Other members are sceptical about aligning themselves with Russia’s push for a new global order. India, for example, is unlikely to sign any statement hailing America’s imminent geopolitical demise. Countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan seek to attract investments from both China and the West while managing relations with Russia, historically the influential power in the region.

The sco’s expansion highlights the often conflicting priorities of its membership. Any club that includes both India and Pakistan, for instance, is unlikely to achieve consensus easily. India also has a border spat with China. In 2021, meanwhile, more than 50 people were killed in clashes on the border between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The persistence of such bilateral disputes has left the sco with a reputation for ineffectiveness. As Temur Umarov of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a think-tank headquartered in Washington, puts it, “bigger is not better” when co-operation is the goal.

If Mr Xi and Mr Putin meet in Samarkand, they may wax lyrical about their unorthodox visions of democracy, or the hypocrisy of America and its allies. That would match the tone of the joint statement they issued after their last meeting, in Beijing in February 2022. But the West has little reason to fret about a dynamic new Sino-Russian-led alliance emerging from the summit. Where brass tacks are concerned, the sco will concentrate on more modest topics, such as the construction of two Chinese-backed railway lines in Central Asia.




什么是上海合作组织？
其不断增长的成员中存在冲突的愿景，这意味着它对西方构成的威胁很小。
文件 - 2018年6月10日，中国国家主席习近平（右）和俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔-普京在中国东部山东省青岛市举行的上海合作组织（SCO）峰会上合影。习近平主席正在利用他自大流行病开始以来的首次海外之行，在与普京和中亚安全集团其他领导人的峰会上宣传中国的战略雄心。(AP Photo/Alexander Zemlianichenko, File)
2022年9月14日



能会对乌兹别克斯坦的撒马尔罕市投以紧张的目光，上海合作组织（Sco）将于9月15日和16日在此举行峰会。中国国家主席习近平，在19号事件爆发后首次出国访问，预计将与俄罗斯总统普京会面。其他出席者包括伊朗总统易卜拉欣-拉伊西；他的国家将成为正式成员。西方领导人显然没有被邀请参加这次会议，这是俄罗斯入侵乌克兰后该组织的第一次峰会。Sco是做什么的，西方应该担心吗？

该组织由中国、哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦、俄罗斯、塔吉克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦于2001年成立，旨在讨论中亚的安全和经济事务，重点是打击恐怖主义和加强贸易联系。尽管其成员已经进行了联合军事演习，但该集团既不是像北约那样的正式防务联盟，也不是像欧盟那样的正式经济联盟。它被设想为一个论坛，中国和俄罗斯可以通过它来处理邻国关系。但该集团最近的扩张使这一使命变得复杂。印度和巴基斯坦在2017年被授予正式成员资格，而伊朗的加入条件是在2021年的一次虚拟峰会上确定的。阿富汗、白俄罗斯和蒙古拥有 "观察员 "地位。该俱乐部还有几个 "对话伙伴"，包括土耳其。


该俱乐部的快速发展反映了对其可能成为的各种愿景的竞争。俄罗斯在西方的孤立使其热衷于在其他地方宣扬其地缘政治的重要性。它希望一个更大的Sco可以为非西方或反西方的大国提供一个合作的途径，并提供一个平台来宣扬普京先生所说的 "多极 "世界的好处。伊朗可能有同样的感觉。作为俄罗斯附庸的白俄罗斯有可能加入，这也是今年峰会讨论的议题之一，这将会拉动同一方向的发展。

但中国，这个最有影响力的成员，更加务实。伦敦智库查塔姆研究所的余杰说，尽管中国与俄罗斯一样有反美情绪，但它不太在意意识形态结盟的宏大概念。中国认为分数是确保其周边安全和保护其在欧亚大陆经济利益的一种手段，作为其 "一带一路 "倡议的一部分，中国已在欧亚大陆投资了数十亿美元的基础设施。其他成员对与俄罗斯推动的全球新秩序保持一致持怀疑态度。例如，印度不太可能签署任何欢呼美国即将消亡的地缘政治的声明。哈萨克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦等国家寻求吸引来自中国和西方的投资，同时处理好与俄罗斯的关系，俄罗斯在历史上是该地区有影响力的大国。

该俱乐部的扩张凸显了其成员的优先事项往往相互冲突。例如，任何同时包括印度和巴基斯坦的俱乐部都不可能轻易达成共识。印度还与中国发生了边界争执。与此同时，2021年，在吉尔吉斯斯坦和塔吉克斯坦边境的冲突中，有超过50人被杀。这类双边争端的持续存在，使得分的效率低下的声誉。正如总部设在华盛顿的智囊团卡内基国际和平基金会的特穆尔-乌马罗夫所说，当合作成为目标时，"更大并不是更好"。

如果习近平先生和普京先生在撒马尔罕会面，他们可能会抒发他们非正统的民主愿景，或美国及其盟友的虚伪性。这将符合他们2022年2月在北京举行的最后一次会晤后发表的联合声明的基调。但是，西方没有什么理由对峰会上出现的由中俄领导的充满活力的新联盟感到担忧。就铜板而言，双方将集中讨论更为温和的议题，例如在中亚建设两条由中国支持的铁路线。