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标题: 2018.08.20 科菲-安南是一位政治家,也是一位和平缔造者 [打印本页]

作者: shiyi18    时间: 2022-8-19 02:04
标题: 2018.08.20 科菲-安南是一位政治家,也是一位和平缔造者
Kofi Annan Was a Politician as Well as a Peacemaker
The former UN secretary-general, who died Saturday, showed what it meant to be a good international civil servant.

By Richard Gowan and World Politics Review
Annan sits with headphones as he listens to George W. Bush at the UN General Assembly in 2006.
Annan listens to George W. Bush at the UN General Assembly in 2006. (Kevin Lamarque / Reuters)
AUGUST 20, 2018
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Kofi Annan’s career was inextricably entangled with power politics. The former United Nations secretary-general, who died on Saturday, spent decades grappling with tensions among the organization’s members over crises from the Balkans to Syria. At times, he managed the turbulence masterfully. At others, he had little or no control over events. Win or lose, Annan occupied a very rare place in the international political firmament as a mediator able to parlay with the biggest powers.

There have already been many tributes to Annan, emphasizing his commitment to a better world and his personal charisma. He will almost certainly rank as one of the best secretaries-general the UN has had. But he was always a politician rather than a saint, and acutely aware of geopolitical realities.


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If Annan was politically canny, he could also be a risk-taker. He worked with the permanent members of the Security Council, above all the United States, when he could. But he was occasionally willing to pick a fight with the big powers when he had to, or to bet his credibility on long-shot political gambits to head off crises that the powers could not resolve themselves. This mix of calculation and gambling offers lessons for UN officials aiming to deal with today’s international tensions.

Annan’s top-level career tracked the rise and decline of American power. He rose through the ranks of the UN during the Cold War, when East-West divisions constantly constrained the institution. He ran the organization from 1997 to 2006, the heyday of American hegemony. But after leaving office, he found himself involved in efforts to ease crises such as the civil war in Syria and the persecution of the Rohingya in Myanmar, which the U.S. was either unable or unwilling to halt.

Unlike his tetchy predecessor, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Annan had no doubts about the need to work with the reality of U.S. power after the Cold War. As Abiodun Williams, a former member of Annan’s front office, notes, he “seemed to be one of the few members of the [UN] secretariat who was able to accept and accommodate American hegemony.” He offered carefully calibrated support to the U.S.-led intervention over Kosovo, even though it did not have Security Council backing.

Yet Annan’s openness to the U.S. was neither unthinking nor unconditional. He hoped to temper American power, not merely channel it, by persuading Washington to work with other powers.

The secretary-general was especially sensitive to Russia’s post–Cold War predicament as a power in a slump. He worked to involve Moscow in solving issues, including not only Kosovo but also the long-suffering peace process between Israelis and Palestinians. Perhaps acknowledging this past generosity, Russian President Vladimir Putin proffered a fulsome tribute to Annan’s “wisdom and courage” this weekend.

Annan’s defense of collective security during the period of U.S. dominance looks prescient now that that dominance has started to slip. But the tensions inherent in his pro-American strategy became acute when it came to the 2003 Iraq War. Annan opposed the war but felt that the UN also needed to be active in Iraq’s postwar reconstruction. Again, this was a dual-purpose strategy: Annan hoped to rebuild ties with Washington while also placating other powers, including France and Russia, that believed the U.S. should not be allowed to rebuild Iraq entirely on its own.


In this drive to keep all sides happy, the UN deployed personnel to Iraq quickly, only to recoil after more than 20 of them died in a suicide bombing in August 2003, including the UN special representative in Iraq, Sérgio Vieira de Mello.

While this was a huge blow for Annan, his advocacy of an early UN role in Iraq was indicative of an important trait of his leadership. Annan was willing to take significant risks—and to push the UN system as a whole to do likewise—even if the chances of success were uncertain. His single greatest personal gamble was a dramatic visit to Baghdad to negotiate with Saddam Hussein over weapons inspections in person in 1998.* Annan also encouraged the Security Council to deploy a series of high-profile UN peacekeeping operations, from East Timor to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, despite the organization’s 1990s failures in the Balkans and Rwanda.

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This was a high-stakes strategy. Blue helmet forces came very close to collapse in Sierra Leone and the DRC, echoing earlier disasters. But the peacekeepers eventually made it through these crises, and in so doing restored the UN’s reputation as a more-or-less reliable conflict manager.

Annan’s final years in office were dogged by disputes with the U.S. over Iraq. But he continued to practice his blend of big-power diplomacy after 2006. Having burnished his reputation as a peacemaker by halting post-electoral violence in Kenya in 2008, Annan stepped up as the UN’s first mediator in the Syrian civil war in 2012. Following the principles of his tenure in New York, he tried to balance Russian and Western interests in forming a deal between President Bashar al-Assad and his opponents. While this led some critics to claim he was soft on Moscow, Annan took a series of risks to fire up a peace process, pushing for peacekeepers to deploy to Syria and convening the big powers in Geneva to hammer out a deal.

These maneuvers failed—there are still arguments over who was to blame—but few mediators other than Annan could have made even these moves. Annan’s reputation as a high-level crisis manager meant that he was often asked to take on especially hard cases in the last years of his career. His final task was to try to develop a solution to the persecution of the Rohingya in Myanmar, another crisis like Syria that has divided the big powers, with no clear end in sight.

The mere fact that Annan was still working on such knotty problems at the end of his life is to his credit. His career navigating big-power politics over the past three decades also offers three important pointers for those who wish to continue his legacy.

The first is the need to work with the realities of global power: Mediators and UN officials cannot cut themselves off from real politics. But secondly, Annan showed that this does not mean simply bowing down to power. A good international civil servant should aim to balance different powers’ interests and help them find political common ground that they might otherwise overlook.

Third and last, that means taking risks. Nobody respects a peacemaker or UN bureaucrat solely because they are good or wise. Actions matter. If a mediator is willing to table difficult peace proposals or to call for a military mission in a country in conflict, they may risk unpopularity or operational failure. Annan bore responsibility for a significant number of failures, and he admitted it. But he also showed that taking serious political risks in the name of peace can pay off.


This post appears courtesy of World Politics Review.

* This piece originally misstated the year Annan and Hussein met as 2000.

Richard Gowan is a senior fellow at the United Nations University’s Centre for Policy Research and teaches at Columbia University.




科菲-安南是一位政治家,也是一位和平缔造者
这位周六去世的前联合国秘书长展示了成为一名优秀国际公务员的意义。

理查德-高文和《世界政治评论》报道
2006年,安南戴着耳机坐在联合国大会上听小布什讲话。
2006年,安南在联合国大会上聆听乔治-W-布什的讲话。(Kevin Lamarque / Reuters)
2018年8月20日
分享
科菲-安南的职业生涯与权力政治密不可分地纠缠在一起。这位于周六去世的前联合国秘书长花了几十年的时间来处理该组织成员之间在巴尔干到叙利亚的危机中的紧张关系。有时,他很好地处理了这种动荡局势。在其他情况下,他对事件几乎没有控制权。无论输赢,安南在国际政治舞台上占据了一个非常罕见的位置,他是一个能够与最大的强国打交道的调解人。

已经有很多人向安南致敬,强调他对一个更美好的世界的承诺和他的个人魅力。他几乎肯定会被列为联合国有史以来最好的秘书长之一。但他始终是一个政治家,而不是圣人,并且敏锐地意识到地缘政治的现实。


1975年大白鲨男士T恤
官方授权的大白鲨装备。100%环纺棉预缩针织软T恤。
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如果说安南在政治上是个聪明人,那么他也可以是个冒险家。他在可能的情况下与安全理事会常任理事国合作,首先是与美国合作。但他偶尔也愿意在必要时与大国争吵,或将自己的信誉押在长期的政治赌博上,以避免大国无法自行解决的危机。这种计算和赌博的结合为旨在处理当今国际紧张局势的联合国官员提供了教训。

安南的高层职业生涯跟踪了美国权力的兴衰。在冷战时期,他在联合国的职位上不断上升,当时东西方的分歧不断制约着这个机构。他在1997年至2006年期间管理该组织,那是美国霸权的鼎盛时期。但在卸任后,他发现自己参与了缓解叙利亚内战和缅甸罗兴亚人受迫害等危机的工作,而美国无法或不愿意制止这些危机。

与他那生硬的前任布特罗斯-布特罗斯-加利不同,安南对冷战后与美国权力的现实合作的必要性毫不怀疑。安南前办公室成员阿比奥顿-威廉姆斯(Abiodun Williams)指出,他 "似乎是[联合国]秘书处中少数能够接受和适应美国霸权的成员之一"。他对美国领导的科索沃干预行动提供了谨慎的支持,尽管它没有得到安全理事会的支持。

然而,安南对美国的开放态度既不是不假思索的,也不是无条件的。他希望通过说服华盛顿与其他大国合作,来缓和美国的力量,而不仅仅是引导它。

这位秘书长对俄罗斯在冷战后作为一个不景气的大国所处的困境特别敏感。他努力让莫斯科参与解决问题,不仅包括科索沃问题,还包括以色列人和巴勒斯坦人之间长期受苦的和平进程。也许是对过去这种慷慨的承认,俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔-普京本周末对安南的 "智慧和勇气 "表示了充分的敬意。

安南在美国主导时期对集体安全的辩护,现在看来是有先见之明的,因为这种主导地位已经开始下滑。但是,在2003年的伊拉克战争中,他的亲美战略所固有的紧张关系变得非常严重。安南反对战争,但认为联合国也需要积极参与伊拉克的战后重建。同样,这是一个双重目的的战略。安南希望重建与华盛顿的关系,同时也安抚其他大国,包括法国和俄罗斯,它们认为不应允许美国完全依靠自己的力量重建伊拉克。


在这种让各方都满意的努力中,联合国迅速向伊拉克部署了人员,但在2003年8月的一次自杀式爆炸事件中,包括联合国驻伊拉克特别代表塞尔吉奥-比埃拉-德梅洛在内的20多名人员丧生后,联合国却退缩了。

虽然这对安南来说是一个巨大的打击,但他主张联合国尽早在伊拉克发挥作用,表明了他的一个重要领导特点。安南愿意承担重大风险,并推动整个联合国系统也这样做,即使成功的机会并不确定。他个人最大的赌注是1998年亲自前往巴格达与萨达姆-侯赛因就武器检查问题进行谈判*。安南还鼓励安理会部署一系列备受瞩目的联合国维和行动,从东帝汶到刚果民主共和国,尽管该组织在20世纪90年代在巴尔干地区和卢旺达的行动都很失败。

推荐阅读

科菲-安南为何失败?
约翰-哈德森(JOHN HUDSON
罗兴亚难民在考克斯巴扎尔等待接受援助。
被误解的缅甸罗兴亚人危机的根源
克里希纳德夫-卡拉穆尔

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世界在卢旺达的失败改变了科菲-安南的世界观

这是一个高风险的战略。蓝盔部队在塞拉利昂和刚果(金)非常接近崩溃,与之前的灾难如出一辙。但维和人员最终度过了这些危机,并因此恢复了联合国作为或多或少可靠的冲突管理者的声誉。

安南在任的最后几年,因与美国在伊拉克问题上的争执而陷入困境。但在2006年之后,他继续实践他的大国外交。2008年,安南制止了肯尼亚选举后的暴力事件,使其作为和平缔造者的名声大振,2012年,安南担任了联合国在叙利亚内战中的首位调解人。遵循他在纽约任职期间的原则,他试图平衡俄罗斯和西方的利益,在巴沙尔-阿萨德总统和他的反对者之间达成协议。虽然这导致一些批评者声称他对莫斯科态度软弱,但安南为启动和平进程承担了一系列风险,推动维和人员部署到叙利亚,并在日内瓦召集大国敲定协议。

这些措施都失败了--关于谁该负责的问题仍有争论--但除了安南之外,很少有调解人能做出这些举动。安南作为高级危机管理人的声誉意味着在他职业生涯的最后几年,他经常被要求处理特别棘手的案件。他的最后一项任务是试图为缅甸的罗兴亚人遭受的迫害制定一个解决方案,这是另一个像叙利亚一样让大国分裂的危机,没有明确的结局。

安南在生命的最后时刻仍在处理这些棘手的问题,这本身就是他的功劳。他在过去三十年里驾驭大国政治的生涯也为那些希望继承他的遗产的人提供了三个重要的指针。

首先是需要与全球权力的现实情况合作。调解员和联合国官员不能将自己与现实政治割裂开来。但其次,安南表明,这并不意味着简单地向权力低头。一个好的国际公务员应该致力于平衡不同大国的利益,并帮助他们找到他们可能忽视的政治共同点。

第三也是最后一点,这意味着要承担风险。没有人会仅仅因为一个和平缔造者或联合国官僚的善良或睿智而尊重他们。行动很重要。如果调解人愿意提出困难的和平建议或呼吁在冲突中的国家开展军事行动,他们可能会冒着不受欢迎或行动失败的风险。安南对大量的失败负有责任,他也承认这一点。但他也表明,以和平的名义承担严重的政治风险可以得到回报。


本文章由《世界政治评论》提供。

* 这篇文章最初将安南和侯赛因会面的年份错报为2000年。

理查德-高文是联合国大学政策研究中心的高级研究员,在哥伦比亚大学任教。

这位周六去世的前联合国秘书长展示了成为一名优秀国际公务员的意义。

理查德-高文和《世界政治评论》报道
2006年,安南戴着耳机坐在联合国大会上听小布什讲话。
2006年,安南在联合国大会上聆听乔治-W-布什的讲话。(Kevin Lamarque / Reuters)
2018年8月20日
分享
科菲-安南的职业生涯与权力政治密不可分地纠缠在一起。这位于周六去世的前联合国秘书长花了几十年的时间来处理该组织成员之间在巴尔干到叙利亚的危机中的紧张关系。有时,他很好地处理了这种动荡局势。在其他情况下,他对事件几乎没有控制权。无论输赢,安南在国际政治舞台上占据了一个非常罕见的位置,他是一个能够与最大的强国打交道的调解人。

已经有很多人向安南致敬,强调他对一个更美好的世界的承诺和他的个人魅力。他几乎肯定会被列为联合国有史以来最好的秘书长之一。但他始终是一个政治家,而不是圣人,并且敏锐地意识到地缘政治的现实。


1975年大白鲨男士T恤
官方授权的大白鲨装备。100%环纺棉预缩针织软T恤。
赞助视频 Govx
查看更多
如果说安南在政治上是个聪明人,那么他也可以是个冒险家。他在可能的情况下与安全理事会常任理事国合作,首先是与美国合作。但他偶尔也愿意在必要时与大国争吵,或将自己的信誉押在长期的政治赌博上,以避免大国无法自行解决的危机。这种计算和赌博的结合为旨在处理当今国际紧张局势的联合国官员提供了教训。

安南的高层职业生涯跟踪了美国权力的兴衰。在冷战时期,他在联合国的职位上不断上升,当时东西方的分歧不断制约着这个机构。他在1997年至2006年期间管理该组织,那是美国霸权的鼎盛时期。但在卸任后,他发现自己参与了缓解叙利亚内战和缅甸罗兴亚人受迫害等危机的工作,而美国无法或不愿意制止这些危机。

与他那生硬的前任布特罗斯-布特罗斯-加利不同,安南对冷战后与美国权力的现实合作的必要性毫不怀疑。安南前办公室成员阿比奥顿-威廉姆斯(Abiodun Williams)指出,他 "似乎是[联合国]秘书处中少数能够接受和适应美国霸权的成员之一"。他对美国领导的科索沃干预行动提供了谨慎的支持,尽管它没有得到安全理事会的支持。

然而,安南对美国的开放态度既不是不假思索的,也不是无条件的。他希望通过说服华盛顿与其他大国合作,来缓和美国的力量,而不仅仅是引导它。

这位秘书长对俄罗斯在冷战后作为一个不景气的大国所处的困境特别敏感。他努力让莫斯科参与解决问题,不仅包括科索沃问题,还包括以色列人和巴勒斯坦人之间长期受苦的和平进程。也许是对过去这种慷慨的承认,俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔-普京本周末对安南的 "智慧和勇气 "表示了充分的敬意。

安南在美国主导时期对集体安全的辩护,现在看来是有先见之明的,因为这种主导地位已经开始下滑。但是,在2003年的伊拉克战争中,他的亲美战略所固有的紧张关系变得非常严重。安南反对战争,但认为联合国也需要积极参与伊拉克的战后重建。同样,这是一个双重目的的战略。安南希望重建与华盛顿的关系,同时也安抚其他大国,包括法国和俄罗斯,它们认为不应允许美国完全依靠自己的力量重建伊拉克。


在这种让各方都满意的努力中,联合国迅速向伊拉克部署了人员,但在2003年8月的一次自杀式爆炸事件中,包括联合国驻伊拉克特别代表塞尔吉奥-比埃拉-德梅洛在内的20多名人员丧生后,联合国却退缩了。

虽然这对安南来说是一个巨大的打击,但他主张联合国尽早在伊拉克发挥作用,表明了他的一个重要领导特点。安南愿意承担重大风险,并推动整个联合国系统也这样做,即使成功的机会并不确定。他个人最大的赌注是1998年亲自前往巴格达与萨达姆-侯赛因就武器检查问题进行谈判*。安南还鼓励安理会部署一系列备受瞩目的联合国维和行动,从东帝汶到刚果民主共和国,尽管该组织在20世纪90年代在巴尔干地区和卢旺达的行动都很失败。

推荐阅读

科菲-安南为何失败?
约翰-哈德森(JOHN HUDSON
罗兴亚难民在考克斯巴扎尔等待接受援助。
被误解的缅甸罗兴亚人危机的根源
克里希纳德夫-卡拉穆尔

在叙利亚,连联合国都被枪杀了
CONNOR SIMPSON
世界在卢旺达的失败改变了科菲-安南的世界观

这是一个高风险的战略。蓝盔部队在塞拉利昂和刚果(金)非常接近崩溃,与之前的灾难如出一辙。但维和人员最终度过了这些危机,并因此恢复了联合国作为或多或少可靠的冲突管理者的声誉。

安南在任的最后几年,因与美国在伊拉克问题上的争执而陷入困境。但在2006年之后,他继续实践他的大国外交。2008年,安南制止了肯尼亚选举后的暴力事件,使其作为和平缔造者的名声大振,2012年,安南担任了联合国在叙利亚内战中的首位调解人。遵循他在纽约任职期间的原则,他试图平衡俄罗斯和西方的利益,在巴沙尔-阿萨德总统和他的反对者之间达成协议。虽然这导致一些批评者声称他对莫斯科态度软弱,但安南为启动和平进程承担了一系列风险,推动维和人员部署到叙利亚,并在日内瓦召集大国敲定协议。

这些措施都失败了--关于谁该负责的问题仍有争论--但除了安南之外,很少有调解人能做出这些举动。安南作为高级危机管理人的声誉意味着在他职业生涯的最后几年,他经常被要求处理特别棘手的案件。他的最后一项任务是试图为缅甸的罗兴亚人遭受的迫害制定一个解决方案,这是另一个像叙利亚一样让大国分裂的危机,没有明确的结局。

安南在生命的最后时刻仍在处理这些棘手的问题,这本身就是他的功劳。他在过去三十年里驾驭大国政治的生涯也为那些希望继承他的遗产的人提供了三个重要的指针。

首先是需要与全球权力的现实情况合作。调解员和联合国官员不能将自己与现实政治割裂开来。但其次,安南表明,这并不意味着简单地向权力低头。一个好的国际公务员应该致力于平衡不同大国的利益,并帮助他们找到他们可能忽视的政治共同点。

第三也是最后一点,这意味着要承担风险。没有人会仅仅因为一个和平缔造者或联合国官僚的善良或睿智而尊重他们。行动很重要。如果调解人愿意提出困难的和平建议或呼吁在冲突中的国家开展军事行动,他们可能会冒着不受欢迎或行动失败的风险。安南对大量的失败负有责任,他也承认这一点。但他也表明,以和平的名义承担严重的政治风险可以得到回报。


本文章由《世界政治评论》提供。

* 这篇文章最初将安南和侯赛因会面的年份错报为2000年。

理查德-高文是联合国大学政策研究中心的高级研究员,在哥伦比亚大学任教。





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